2 Postdoc Positions in Algorithmic Game Theory, Liverpool and Glasgow

Two postdoc positions in Algorithmic Game Theory are available at the Universities of Liverpool and Glasgow, on a EPSRC-funded research project entitled "Efficient Algorithms for Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfer".

The aim of this project is to find new approximate and optimal, truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, matching problems with preferences and facility location problems, in each case in the absence of monetary transfer. This will involve theoretical research, to include the design and analysis of new algorithms, and also practical implementation and experimental evaluation of these algorithms.

Deadline: 12 November 2012. For more information, see http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/%7Epiotr/EPSRC-postdoc.html or http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~davidm/postdoc.html, or contact ulle.endriss at uva.nl.