(New) 16 January 2025, Special seminar, Joseph Berkovitz

On the role of intuitive thinking in scientific reasoning

Abstract. The common epistemic frameworks in the literature focus on propositional knowledge and conscious inferential reasoning and portray inductive reasoning in logical terms. The idea is that, ideally, the relation between the evidence and the conclusions of an inductive inference should be logical. It is thus common to call the system of rules that should govern rational inductive reasoning 'inductive logic'.

We argue that the common epistemic frameworks largely overlook or marginalize the central role that non-propositional epistemic resources and unconscious, non-inferential reasoning play in shaping the nature of scientific reasoning and knowledge. In particular, we argue that these frameworks severely restrict the scope for incorporating the central role that non-propositional epistemic resources, such as instinctive and intuitive thinking and know-how, play in scientific reasoning. We then propose a new epistemic framework that places instinctive and intuitive thinking and know-how at centre stage. In this framework, the foundations of scientific reasoning are psychological rather than logical. We conclude by considering the implications of this framework for scientific reasoning and knowledge.

For more information contact Sebastian De Haro at s.deharo at uva.nl.