30 November 2023, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Julian Chingoma

Abstract

Proportionality is an often desired property in social-choice scenarios such as apportionment and multiwinner voting, and there have been recent strides in introducing proportionality to richer, more general social-choice models. In this work, we look to import proportionality into the setting where individuals vote over a number of interdependent, binary issues. The proportionality axioms we study are based on well-studied notions from multiwinner voting, namely extended justified representation (EJR) and Priceability. And in this work, we show that while it is challenging to satisfy those EJR-like properties, even in an approximate sense, we find that turning towards axioms based on Priceability yields a more positive outlook. Joint work with Umberto Grandi and Arianna Novaro.

For more information on the Computational Social Choice Seminar, please consult https://staff.science.uva.nl/u.endriss/seminar/.