27 November 2018, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Ulle Endriss

Abstract

Judgment aggregation (JA) is an approach to modelling collective decision making in which the range of choices available to the agents is represented with the help of propositional logic. In this talk, I will discuss a new model of JA that allows for an explicit distinction between rationality constraints on the one hand and feasibility constraints on the other. The former are assumed to be satisfied by the choices made by the individual agents, while the latter must be met by the collective decision returned by the aggregation rule. While this natural distinction has been largely ignored in prior work on JA, I will demonstrate how making it explicit opens up exciting new avenues for research and how it clarifies the link between JA and voting theory. The talk will be accessible to, and possibly even enjoyable for, people with little or no prior exposure to these topics.

For more information on the Computational Social Choice Seminar, please consult https://staff.science.uva.nl/u.endriss/seminar/.