2-3 September 2013, Workshop: Thought Experiments, Counterfactuals and Modal Knowledge, Berlin, Germany

In philosophy, claims of knowledge are often based on considering non-actual scenarios. But it is not so clear what explains and justifies such practices. Opposing the traditional view that the knowledge at stake is conceptual or based on rational intuitions, Timothy Williamson has come up with a revolutionary proposal: both modal claims and thought experiments can be accounted for in terms of our capacity for evaluating everyday counterfactuals. No wonder this innovative proposal sparked intense debate.

To mention just two critical points: First, one might wonder whether our ability to evaluate the relevant counterfactuals depends upon prior knowledge of metaphysical necessity or essentiality. If so, the account runs the risk of being circular. Second, Williamson's account of thought experiments is designed to address the problem that any case description could be realised in a deviant way. One might suspect that Williamson?s own counterfactual account falls prey to the same difficulty. The workshop aims at promoting the critical discussion of the counterfactual account of both modal knowledge and thought experiments.

For more information, see https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/institut/lehrbereiche/idealismus/. If you would like to participate, please contact Daniel Dohrn: dohrndan at cms.hu-berlin.de.