CfP: Special issue of Erkenntnis "Game Theoretic Models of Communication"

What role does the assumption of rationality play in communication? Game Theory provides a powerful tool for investigating this question. If agents are assumed to be perfectly rational, classical Game Theory can model linguistic tasks such as pragmatic interpretation as equilibrium calculations. If agents are assumed to be simple learners, then Evolutionary Game Theory can model the emergence of apparently rational signaling systems. However, real language users are neither perfectly rational, nor as simple as the agents in evolutionary games. This collection aims to explore models of communicative interaction which lie between these extremes.

We invite submissions which utilize the tools of Game Theory (broadly construed) in order to investigate the assumption of rationality (and its limits) in models of communication. Deadline for Submissions: March 31, 2012. Notification of Acceptance: May 31, 2012.

Editors: Alistair Isaac (Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania) and Sven Lauer (Department of Linguistics, Stanford University). Papers prepared for blind review should be sent to aisaac at sas.upenn.edu.