13-14 March 2007, Logics and Collective Decision Making (LCD07), Lille, France

Group decision-making problems occur every time a collective choice has to be made from several individuals that have conflicting interests or preferences. There has been recently a growing interest on the use of logic as the basic tool for formalizing and computing those problems. This is in particular true in two close fields of research. The first one lies at the intersection of game theory and logics, especially by exploring how modal logics may be used to model and reason about games. A second one, which focuses on the logical insights into rational collective choice, has recently emerged around problems of judgment aggregation and beliefs/goals merging, on the one hand, and logical formalization of welfare distribution processes (social software), on the other. These two domains propose further formal refinements, using logical tools, of the classical theories of collective decision-making, by offering new evaluation criteria of and new ways of building social choice procedures. The workshop aims at sparking off interaction between social choice theorists, computer scientists, logicians and philosophers.

For more information, see http://www.illc.uva.nl/LCD07/ or contact us via lcd07 at hotmail.fr.