5 April 2019, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Daan Bloembergen

Abstract

This talk consists of two parts. In the first part, I will present our recent paper that was published at AAAI'19, titled "On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy". Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. In the paper we propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these results by means of simulations to study the effect of network structures on group's accuracy, and various aspects of the patterns of delegations that emerge in this type of interaction. In the second part, I will sketch a brief and high-level overview of my main area of research, which focuses on multi-agent reinforcement learning.

For more information on the Computational Social Choice Seminar, please consult https://staff.science.uva.nl/u.endriss/seminar/.