29 April 2010, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Paolo Turrini

Abstract

The talk will discuss the relation between two independent research threads in the study of social interaction within multiagent systems: Game Theory and Dependence Theory. While the former lies on solid mathematical foundations, for the latter several informal accounts exist, but no unified formal theory.

It will be maintained that the fundamental relation of Dependence Theory, "agent i depends on agent j for the realization of goal p", can be given a natural gametheoretical semantics. Most importantly, it will be observed how cycles arising from dependence relations and equilibrium outcomes in games can be related. This allows for the study of 'agreements', structural transformations of the strategic interaction, that 'solve' dependence relations, giving rise to a new class of coalitional games.

The unification presented provides Dependence Theory with the sort of mathematical foundations which still lacks, and shows how Game Theory can incorporate dependence-theoretic considerations in a fully formal manner.

The talk is based on joint work with Davide Grossi (ILLC, Amsterdam).