21 November 2008, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Ulle Endriss

Abstract

Much work in voting theory makes two assumptions: (1) the voters have preferences over candidates that are total orders, and (2) ballots have the same kind of structure as the preferences. In this talk I shall explore explore what happens when we drop these assumptions. Specifically, I shall discuss how the notion of strategy-proofness of a voting procedure is affected when the preference and the ballot language can differ, which may make it impossible for a sincere voter to vote by reproducing their true preference on the ballot sheet.

This is joint work with Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi and Brent Venable.

For more information, see http://www.illc.uva.nl/~ulle/seminar/ or contact Ulle Endriss (ulle.endriss at uva.nl).