1 July 2022, Computational Social Choice Seminar, Jason Marden

Abstract

How should a system operator strategically allocate its assets in an adversarial environment? In this talk, we explore this question in the context of the well-studied Colonel Blotto game. Colonel Blotto games model strategic scenarios where two opposing entities are tasked with allocating a given number of assets over a collection of fronts. The classical setting has primarily focused on scenarios where each front is associated with an independent valuation and each entity seeks to maximize the cumulative performance over the fronts. This talk will focus on emerging variants of these Colonel Blotto games encompassing both informational asymmetries and alternative structures for the classic linear sum objectives. One such variant we will focus on is a “networked” Colonel Blotto game, where the valuation of a front now depends on the outcome associated with other fronts in the system.

For more information on the Computational Social Choice Seminar, please consult https://staff.science.uva.nl/u.endriss/seminar/.